Newspaper headline writers have a tough job. Under deadline pressure, they have to summarize complex essays in a few words. Like most of us trying to do complicated things quickly, they sometimes make mistakes.
But there are occasions where the headline is so well chosen that it comes close to precluding the need to read the succeeding column. A good recent example of that is an Oct. 21 New York Times op-ed: “Are We Losing Afghanistan Again?”
This invocation of the possibility that President Obama will “lose” Afghanistan is both an example of the pressure that led him to make the incorrect decision to extend America’s combat presence in this country and the key to why that pressure should be ignored.
It takes us back to the 1940s, when right-wing Republicans denounced Democrats for “losing” China to the Communists. So deeply scarred were Democrats by this that it led first President Kennedy, then President Johnson, to a far deeper military involvement in Vietnam than was wise.
The sad fact is that there was never anything we could have done to prevent a Viet Cong takeover of Vietnam and, as in Iraq, our military intervention there wound up doing more harm than good. It is now clear that from a strategic standpoint America suffered no damage whatsoever from failing to stop communism in that region.
What happened to China is unfortunately similar to what is happening today in Afghanistan: Internal dynamics have put people of whom we legitimately morally disapprove in a position to take over the country. The refutation of the argument that President Truman “lost” China is the simple fact that we never owned it.
And, in Afghanistan even more than in China, there is little argument that the simple fact that the country is being run by people for whom we have a very legitimate dislike is a threat to us. That argument applies with even greater force to both Iraq and Syria. In neither of those latter two countries were the dictators who were running them a threat to the United States.
It is true with regard to Afghanistan that we suffered greatly because that nation allowed Osama bin Laden to use it as his base for mass murder. But our invasion of Afghanistan – for which I voted – was based not on the view that Taliban rule of that country was itself incompatible with American interest, but rather that we could not accept their willingness to continue to shelter this brutal killer.
George W. Bush coexisted with the Taliban for the first eight months of his administration, with no sign that he felt the need to overthrow it. Indeed, we now know it was Iraq more than Afghanistan that was the target of the Dick Cheney-led neoconservatives who were looking for a chance to show that America could impose order on the world. The former vice president is, of course, among the last of those who think that worked out well.
We invaded Afghanistan legitimately only when they refused to allow us to take bin Laden. Had they been willing to do so, based on their claim that sheltering a killer of that magnitude was a requirement of their hospitality, America would have left the Taliban’s rule untouched.
So we intervened, overthrew the Taliban and installed an Afghan regime hostile to it. And at that point, having established the rule of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces, Obama sensibly announced that we were withdrawing.
Sadly, what then happened in Afghanistan – and appears to be happening to some extent in Iraq – is that the forces within that country whom we installed as the government proved unable to sustain themselves. I am deeply disappointed by this, and somewhat puzzled by it.
For as long as I can remember, Afghans have been rated as among the world’s most effective fighters. As far back as the 19th century, they resisted a British takeover at the time when that empire was controlling many of their neighbors. After some years of independence, when the Russians invaded, the Afghans – with some American help, but largely by their own efforts – expelled the Soviet Union.
For reasons I have never fully understood, the Afghan army and allied militias that took over the country after our defeat of the Taliban do not live up to this reputation for effective fighting. With all the advantages the Afghan regime receives from American participation, they have been unable to maintain control of the country against the Taliban.
It is true that the Taliban receives some outside help from worldwide jihadists, but when I hear it argued that we cannot withdraw because in the absence of American airpower they will be unable to maintain control, I am struck by the fact that their Taliban enemies have no airpower at all.
I am also deeply puzzled by the argument that the problem is that we have not provided sufficient training to the Afghan army. Once again I have to ask, who has been training the Taliban? Is deeply regrettable superior fighting ability in many cases due to some unknown set of trainers of whom we are unaware?
That brings us to the current situation. Because in Afghanistan the United States made one successful effort to put people in power against their internal enemies, critics of Obama’s decision to withdraw our troops insist that we cannot withdraw until the success of the faction we have supported in their civil war is assured. Rebutting this argument is the essential first step in formulating a rational national security policy, and I will try to do so next week.
Barney Frank is a retired congressman and the author of landmark legislation. He divides his time between Maine and Massachusetts.
Twitter: BarneyFrank
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