From the days when Vice President Cheney and his office warriors were inventing WMDs, through the revolving door of generals since that time, our Iraq strategy has been vague, varied – and in vain. It has morphed and re-morphed from Shock and Awe to Mission Accomplished, to Regime Change, past Spreading Democracy and on through Establishing Security. It now seems to be Hearts and Minds, Reconstruction or Sunni Buddyism.
Lucius Flatley, the well-known Gorham professor emeritus whose book, “George Washington, Equine Provocateur,” won favorable reviews, was asked last week to figure the strategy Washington would recommend. Lucius initially wondered if 18th-century strategy would translate into the 21st. When reminded that Mr. Bush chooses “constructionist” judges who interpret the Constitution exactly as written during that same century, the professor agreed to give the war some study.
His results were edifying
As a benchmark he insisted that there was no way Washington would have even considered an invasion of Iraq. The father of our country, he said, vigorously objected to “foreign entanglements.” With that caveat established, Lucius systematically organized and outlined the problem. First, he said, there are some major differences that operate to the disadvantage of he United States.
For one, in 1776, the antagonists shared religion. Today, the invaders are considered religious monsters. Second, in 1776, the British spoke the local language. Today, the U.S. can’t buy breakfast without an interpreter.
Beyond those differences, the similarities are striking. Much like the British of yesterday, the Americans are trying to establish control over a large territory, thousands of difficult miles distant, most of whose inhabitants resent them. Both invaders have local supporters who wanted to use foreign muscle as a cat’s paw to pull from the fire of war a chestnut of riches and power: Loyalists then, Shiites now. The invader’s gold is important in both conflicts. Two centuries ago, British purchases of food, whiskey and supplies were welcome to farmers and fishermen. Today, new roads, water, electricity and neighborhood security are attractive to The Faithful and their many wives. Also, there is an outsider involved: Iran, which supports majority Shiites, can be compared (in a limited way) to France, which supported the Rebels.
In the “Shock and Awe” phase of the British strategy in 1776, they were similarly successful, like the bombing of 2003. Washington was driven from the Northeast in successive battles – to be saved by winter – before he called on Nathaniel Greene, a businessman with no prior military experience, to take whatever forces he could muster and mount another front in Virginia and the Carolinas. (Professor Flatley noted parenthetically that Washington and his favorite general, Greene – unlike the revolving door of generals of today – served together in combat for the entire war.)
Greene took a new tack. Using hit-and-run ripostes as his forces lost every battle, they slid south through Virginia and the Carolinas, leaving snipers and the 18th-century equivalent of roadside bombs. After losing each skirmish, he reorganized and regrouped his scattered, ill-equipped forces for yet another losing battle. But he remained in the war.
Studying, and approving these tactics, Washington adopted a similar broad strategy while he waited for France to provide the sea power, which would discourage the British.
Stated in its essence, said Professor Flatley, George Washington found that to win his war, he had to lose it.
Fortunately, the British recognized the fact that Washington’s willingness to keep losing was apparently bottomless and, wisely, they made a negotiated withdrawal, taking Benedict Arnold with them to a life of ease in London.
Draw, Lucius said, your own conclusions.
Rodney Quinn, who lives in Gorham, is a former Maine secretary of state. He can be reached at rquinn@maine.rr.com.
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