JACKSONVILLE, Fla. — A pilot who spoke with the captain of the doomed freighter El Faro says just before the ship’s final voyage that the captain was aware of a storm brewing at sea, but that he had a plan to “go under it” – go south of it.
Eric Bryson is the pilot who sailed the El Faro out of the Port of Jacksonville on its final voyage. He testified Monday before the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation.
Bryson said he remembered no irregularities with the 790-foot cargo ship, and that its crew was acting normally as it prepared to sail Sept. 29 to Puerto Rico.
Before he disembarked, Bryson says El Faro Capt. Michael Davidson told him he was aware that the storm that would later become Hurricane Joaquin. Bryson said Davidson was “going to go out and shoot under it.”
The ship lost propulsion and sank after getting caught in a Category 4 hurricane last October, killing all 33 aboard.
The second round of investigative hearings into the freighter’s sinking is seeking new information about the vessel’s stability and whether there were mistakes in weather forecasting or cargo loading before the ship’s final voyage.The U.S. Coast Guard’s Marine Board of Investigation began questioning witnesses Monday morning in Jacksonville, Florida.
Search crews recently discovered the El Faro’s voyage data recorder in 15,000 feet of water, but couldn’t recover it.
The National Transportation Safety Board is planning a recovery mission for the device, which could hold recordings from the bridge.
The Coast Guard says a future round of hearings will explore the recorder’s data if the device is recovered.
In January, the first round of investigative hearings looked into the actions of the crew and officials with the El Faro’s owner Tote Services Inc. before and during the voyage.
Testimony showed that the 790-foot freighter’s captain, Michael Davidson, had taken a slower-but-safer route during Tropical Storm Erika in August 2015, after the company sent out a weather alert.
No such alerts or discussions of the weather were found for the period before the stronger Hurricane Joaquin, but emails showed that the day before the ship sank, Davidson had asked his superiors about changing to the slower route home.
While he was authorized to do so by a company official, Davidson chose not to take the slower route, and Tote officials testified that the final decision was his.
Testimony also showed that Tote officials did not actively chart weather systems that may pose a safety concern for the company’s fleet. Capt. John Lawrence, who was the last to speak with Davidson, didn’t understand the depth of the El Faro’s troubles until after Davidson’s final call ashore to report that he was in distress.
Lawrence testified that, after the call, his office finally charted the course of the storm along with the ship’s last known coordinates. Only then did he realize Joaquin was bearing down on the El Faro.
Since the El Faro’s sinking, Tote has upgraded the weather tracking systems available to its fleet.
Among the information to be addressed at the new hearings is whether the ship was loaded properly with its heavy cargo, and what weather forecasts the captain and crew had prior and during the final voyage.
This stoy will be updated.
Send questions/comments to the editors.
